

ELIZABETH FRICKER
Curriculum Vitae
(updated September 2019)

Appendix 1 provides statement of historic personal circumstances; Appendix 2 contains abstracts of recent papers.

Degrees

1986 D.Phil thesis in Philosophy, Oxford: 'Knowledge and Language'

1979 B.Phil in Philosophy, Oxford - pass with distinction (incl. thesis: 'Rules and Language: an Examination of some of Wittgenstein's Arguments')

1975 B.A. Hons in Philosophy and Economics, University of Oxford - 1st Class

Employment

August 2017- May 2020: Visiting Professor, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, USA

Jan 2007 – Sept 2017 Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Magdalen College, Oxford, and University Lecturer ('UL') in Philosophy, Oxford University

1989 – Dec 2006 Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Magdalen College, Oxford, and 'C.U.F.' Lecturer in Philosophy, Oxford University

1987-'89 Fixed-term Fellow and tutor in Philosophy, Magdalen College, Oxford

1980-85 Junior Research Fellow, Magdalen College, Oxford

RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

Publications - since 1991

1. Books

In preparation. *Testimony: Speech Act and Epistemic Source*. To be published by Oxford University Press. This will collect the most substantial of my recently published articles from my work on testimony, plus two previously unpublished ones, and a new introduction. I expect to have this ready to go to press by end-December 2019.

OUP's philosophy editor Peter Momtchiloff has indicated in conversation that he is keen also to publish a second volume of my collected essays, comprising previously published articles on testimony and related topics that will not be included in the first volume as above.

2. Articles

Most of the articles cited below can be found, with links, in the entry for me on [Phil Papers](#). Alternatively, many can be found in pre-print form on my personal webpage on [Academia.edu](#).

[forthcoming 2021] 'Trust and Autonomy' - essay in collection edited by Kirk Lougheed and Jonathan Matheson: "The plan is to have a volume *Essays on Epistemic Autonomy* consisting of 15-18 original research essays 6K-8K words each. We are confident that this volume will be attractive to a major academic press, and it would be great to have you be a part of it".

[forthcoming 2020] 'Should we worry about robots taking over our skills?' Royal Institute of Philosophy Proceedings (from lecture to be given in autumn 2019 in London, in RIP lecture series - see below)

[forthcoming 2020] 'Assertion and its Norm' in *Analytic Philosophy* (edited from U.Texas at Austin by David Sosa)

[in press 2019] 'Believing the Speaker' versus Believing on Evidence: a Critique of Moran The Exchange of Words Ch.2' contribution to symposium on Richard Moran *The Exchange of Words*, to be published in *European Journal of Philosophy* ed. Andrew Hiddleston (from symposium at APA Central February 2019 - see below)

2019 'Epistemic and Practical Dependence and the Value of Skills, Or: Satnavs, good or bad?' in K.Dormandy (ed.) *Trust in Epistemology*. Routledge pp.64-88

2019 Knowing Full Well from Testimony? in *Episteme* special issue in honour of Ernest Sosa

2017c 'Inference to the Best Explanation and the Receipt of Testimony: Testimonial Reductionism Vindicated' in *Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation*. K. McCain, T. Poston (eds.) Oxford, Oxford University Press: 262-294.

2017b 'Norms, Constitutive and Social, and Assertion' *American Philosophical Quarterly* 54(4): 397-418. Special issue on social norms.

2017a: 'Zeugnis und Epistemologische Autonomie' (translation of 2006a) in *Philosophie der Zeugenschaft: eine Anthologie*. S. Kramer, S. Schmidt, J.G. Schulein (eds) Fink-Verlag, Munich

2016 'Unreliable Testimony' in *Alvin Goldman and his Critics*. H.Kornblith, B. McLaughlin (eds.) Oxford, Blackwell.

2015a 'Doing What Comes Naturally: Zagzebski on Rationality and Epistemic Self-Trust' in *Episteme* DOI: 10.1017/epi.2015.37 pp.1-16

2015b 'Know First, Tell Later: the Truth about Craig on Knowledge', in Greco.J. and Henderson. D. (eds.) *Epistemic Evaluations*. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 46-86

2015c 'How to Make Individious Distinctions Amongst Reliable Testifiers' in *Episteme* 12, special 10th Anniversary issue of invited papers. 173-202

June 2014 'Epistemic Trust in Oneself and Others – an Argument from Analogy?' in T.O'Connor and L. Callahan (eds) *Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue*, Oxford. Oxford University Press. 174-203

2012 'Stating and Insinuating', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 86. 61-94.

2009 'Is Knowing a State of Mind – the Case Against' in P.Greenough and D.Pritchard (eds.) *Williamson on Knowledge*. Oxford University Press. 31-61

2008 'Against Gullibility' (1994 below) reprinted in full in E.Sosa, J.Kim, J. Fantl and M.McGrath (eds.) *Epistemology: An Anthology*, Blackwells Philosophy Anthologies series (2nd edn). Wiley-Blackwell. 815-35.

2007 'Audi on Testimony' in J.Greco , A. Mele and M.Timmons (eds.) *Essays on the Work of Robert Audi*. Oxford University Press.

2006e 'Martians and Meetings: Against Burge's NeoKantian Apriorism about Testimony' *Philosophica* Vol 78 no2 (special issue on testimony). 69-84

2006d 'Second-Hand Knowledge' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* Vol 73 no.3. 592-618

2006c 'Varieties of Anti-Reductionism about Testimony: a Reply to Goldberg and Henderson' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* Vol 72 no.3, May 2006, 618-28.

2006b: 'Against Gullibility' (1994 below) now reprinted in: Sven Bernecker (ed.) *Reading Epistemology: Selected Texts with Interactive Commentary* (Malden MA, and Blackwell: Oxford). Series editors: Jennifer Hornsby, Sam Guttenplan, Chris Janaway. (It appears as one of two pieces reprinted in the section on testimony, along with Tyler Burge's 'Content Preservation'.)

2006a: 'Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy' in E.Sosa and J.Lackey (eds) *Epistemology of Testimony*. Oxford University Press. 225-250

2004 : 'Testimony: knowing through Being Told' in Niiniluoto, M.Sintonen and J.Wolenski (eds.), *Handbook of Epistemology*, Kluwer Academic Publishers. Netherlands. pp.109-130

2003: 'Understanding and Knowledge of what is Said' in Alex Barber (ed.) *Epistemology of Language*, Oxford University Press. pp.325-366

2002: 'Trusting Others in the Sciences: A priori or Empirical Warrant?' *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* Vol 33. 373-383

1997: 'Self-Knowledge: Special Access versus Artefact-of-Grammar: a Dichotomy Rejected', in C.Macdonald, B. Smith and C.Wright (eds.) *Knowing our own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge* Oxford, Clarendon Press. (reprinted in paperback 2001), 155-206;

1995: 'Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony'. *Mind* Vol 104, 393-411.

1994: 'Against Gullibility' in B.K.Matilal and A.Chakrabarti (eds.) *Knowing from Words*. Kluwer - Synthese Library series. Dordrecht, Holland, 125-161.

1993: 'The Threat of Eliminativism' *Mind and Language* Vol 8 no.2, 253-281

1991: 'Analyticity, Linguistic Practice, and Philosophical Method' in K.Puhl (ed) *Meaning Skepticism*. Berlin, De Gruyter, 218-250

2. Reviews, encyclopaedia entries

[forthcoming 2019] Review of Richard Moran *The Exchange of Words*, in *Mind*.

2014 Entry on 'Trust' for revised edition of new *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* ed. R.Audi. (600 words)

2006: entry on 'Testimony' (revised and expanded to 2,000 words) for new edition of the MacMillan *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* ed. Borchert

2002: 'From Concepts to Knowledge'. Critical Notice of C.A.B.Peacocke, 'Being Known'. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* Vol 10 (1). pp.75-91.

1998 : entry on 'Testimony' for the new *Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* ed. R.Audi

1997: review for *Philosophical Books* of C. MacDonald ed. 'Connectionism - Debates on Psychological Explanation'

1996: entry on 'Testimony' for Supplement to *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*

3.Papers given at conferences, etc.

[March 2020] - visiting colloquium speaker, U.Georgia

[Spring 2020] - visiting colloquium speaker U.Chicago

[November 2019] lecture, Royal Institute of Philosophy series, London: Should we worry about robots taking over our skills?

September 17-18 2019: Invited speaker at 2-day workshop on Epistemic Autonomy, U. Madrid organised by Jesus Encabo (other papers by submission)

June 2019 Main speaker at international conference on social epistemology in Bled, Slovenia

April 2019 Main speaker at workshop on Epistemology of Social Science, U. Vermont, Burlington

February 2019 commentator in book symposium on Richard Moran *The Exchange of Words*, APA Central, Denver

6-7 November 2018: invited commentator at workshop on linguistic understanding at University of Oslo (two papers at the workshop were critiques of Fricker 2003 above)

October 2018: Main speaker, Midwest Epistemology Workshop hosted at Notre Dame. paper title: Trust and Testimonial Justification

July 2018: main speaker at Episteme conference in honour of Ernest Sosa, Tenerife (papers to be published in Episteme special issue) Paper title: Testimony, Aptness and Safety

May 2018: commentator on paper by Mikkel Gerken at first Social Epistemology Network conference in Oslo, Norway

December 2017: one of four main speakers at Eighth Annual Analytic Philosophy Symposium hosted at University of Austin, Texas (papers to be published in journal Analytic Philosophy). Paper title: Assertion and its Norm

November 2017 Main speaker at international conference 'Assertion, Norms and Effects' at University of Trieste. Paper title: Assertion and its Norm

September 2017: Keynote speaker at graduate conference hosted at University College London paper title: the Prizes and Perils of Trusting Others

June 2017 commentator on paper at workshop: Testimony and the Law, hosted at University of Nottingham

June 2017 Main speaker, international epistemology conference, Bled, Slovenia. Paper title: The Prizes and Perils of Trusting others

March 2017: main speaker giving paper, plus also responding with comments on other participants' papers, at one-day workshop at University College Dublin devoted to critical discussion of my own work on testimony. Organiser: Maria Bagramian. paper title: Norms, Constitutive and Social, and Assertion

On previous day gave separate talk in philosophy dept of UCD. paper title: The Prizes and Perils of Trusting Others

February 2017: speaker, Moral Sciences club, Cambridge University. Paper title: The Prizes and Perils of Trusting Others

December 2016: Gave talk in philosophy dept at Catholic University of Innsbruck, and participant at conference on Trust. paper title -as for Munich below

December 2016: Main speaker at workshop on Epistemic Autonomy, University of Munich, Bavaria, Germany. paper title: the Prizes and Perils of Trusting Others

Month of Sept 2016: Collins Visiting Professor at St Louis University, giving a graduate-level seminar on my research on testimony

March 2016 Invited commentator in session on norm of assertion, APA Central Division Meeting, Chicago

January 2016: main invited speaker, workshop on Epistemic Dependence, at Madrid University

November 2015: main invited speaker at conference on epistemology of the internet, Modena, university of Modena.

June 2015: main speaker, international philosophy conference in epistemology and philosophy of mind, Bled, Slovenia.

May 2015: Keynote speaker, graduate conference, Edinburgh University ; My talk 'The Social Norm of Assertion' was videod and can be viewed in full on Youtube: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UoIeuPQEbG0>

May 18-20 2015: Main speaker, conference on Explanationism in Epistemology organised by Ted Poston of University of Alabama. Venue: Orange Beach, Alabama. Papers to be published in edited volume by OUP.

April 2015: Invited symposium participant, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting, Vancouver, session on Allen Hazlett's book *A Luxury of the Understanding*, concerning epistemic norms of belief.

March 2015 – distinguished visitor for 2 weeks at Templeton Project on Intellectual Humility, at St Louis University. Including:
Main Speaker at conference on Social Norms, 18-20 March, St Louis University.

Jan 2015 – talk to Dept at Edinburgh University Phil Dept

June 2014 Main speaker, conference on 'Testimony and Religious Belief', part of Templeton project 'New Insight and Directions in Religious Epistemology at Philosophy dept, university of Oxford. Material presented from Fricker (June 2014).

May 2014 Talk to Graduate Philosophy Society, Philosophy Dept, Cambridge: 'Satnavs – Good or Bad?'

May 2014. Main speaker at Chambers Epistemology conference, University of Lincoln, Nebraska. Presented paper: 'On Not Being Able to Believe what one is told'

May 2014. Talk in Philosophy Dept, Northwestern University, Evanston, Chicago

April 2014. Talk in philosophy dept, University of Southern California, Los Angeles.

April 2014. Speaker in 3-hour 'author meets critics' symposium session on Linda Zagzebski Trust and Authority, American Philosophical Association meeting, Western Division, San Diego, California

Jan 2014. Main speaker, Episteme 2-day workshop. San Jose, Costa Rica (papers to be published in special 10th anniversary volume as above).

June 2013. Main speaker (plenary session), international philosophy conference, Bled, Slovenia.

May 2013. Talk in Philosophy Dept, New York University.

October 2012. Talk in philosophy Dept, Bristol University

July 2012 First speaker in plenary session symposium, Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association at Stirling University. (this is the main annual meeting of major professional associations in the UK) paper published Fricker (2012)

May 2012. Main speaker, conference at University of Nottingham on 'Testimony, Aesthetic and Otherwise'.

August 2011. Main speaker, conference on Epistemic Autonomy at Humboldt University, Berlin.

June 2011. Main speaker, international conference on 'Knowledge, Understanding and Wisdom' in Bled, Slovenia.

March 2011 Main speaker, international conference on 'Understanding, Knowledge and Testimony' at the university of Cologne, Germany.

April 4-15 2011. Edith Kreeger Distinguished Visiting Professor, Philosophy Dept, Northwestern University. Duties included one non-specialist public lecture, 2 lectures with discussion to professional audience, and 5 read-ahead discussion sessions of draft chapters of my book 'Testimony: Speech Act and Epistemic Source'.

March 2010 – main speaker, 'Basic Knowledge' workshop, Univ of Aberdeen, part of Northern Institute of Philosophy programme

March 2010 – visiting speaker, Trinity College, Dublin.

Feb 2010 – commentator in symposium about testimony, American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Chicago.

January 2010 – Keynote speaker, fourth conference of the Flemish-Dutch Society for Analytic Philosophy in Leuven.

October 2009 – guest speaker in philosophy dept, University of York.

Dec 2007 – invited solo guest speaker for 2-day workshop devoted to discussion of my work on testimony, University of Leuven, Belgium

August 2007 – main speaker, conference on Social Epistemology, Stirling University

June 2007 invited paper at conference in philosophy dept of Sofia University, Bulgaria.

May 2007 invited paper at conference at inter-university center, Dubrovnik, Croatia.

Nov 2006 – workshop participant, Arche epistemology series, St Andrews

October 2006 – invited paper (visiting speaker series) dept of philosophy, Glasgow University.

June 2006 – invited speaker, conference in HOPOS (Hist and Phil of Science) series, Ecole Normale, Paris

October 2005 invited paper, visiting speaker series (inaugurating series), Philosophy Centre, London University (held at Senate House)

May 2005: invited speaker at conference on Epistemology and Metaphysics in Dubrovnik (main organizer: George Pappas)

May 2005: Main invited speaker (one of 5, in 5 plenary sessions), 5th Rutgers Epistemology Conference. New Brunswick, USA. (Papers posted on web in advance; 20 mins presentation, followed by 90 minutes question and answer session. Over 150 participants, from all parts of North America and elsewhere. Accepting invitation to be a main speaker is contract to publication of paper in PPR - see 2006d above.)

April 2005: Notre Dame University, USA: conference of contributors to forthcoming volume on the work of Robert Audi (see forthcoming 2007c above) – I was unable to attend this conference, but a draft of my paper for the volume was presented by a graduate student, and commented on by Jennifer Lackey.

March 2004: invited speaker, conference on 'Testimony and Trust', Philosophy Dept, Birmingham University (organizer: Max Kobel)

Sept 2003: invited speaker, workshop on applied epistemology, Kings College, Cambridge (organizer Neil Manson)

March 2002: invited speaker at one-day conference, Senate House, Univ of London, on the work of Tim Williamson. (talk title: 'Knowing is not a State of Mind')

December 2001: commentating speaker (session on testimony), American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting. Atlanta, USA.

July 2000: main speaker, conference on Epistemology of Language sponsored by Br.Acad, Mind Association, etc, Sheffield (paper title: 'Understanding and Knowledge of what is said') (a volume of essays , published by OUP, is in preparation from this conference)

April 2000: Invited commentator, 2nd Annual Rutgers Epistemology Conference, New Brunswick.

April 2000b: invited speaker, talk at City of New York Graduate Center (philosophy).

March 1998: Main speaker ('invited paper') at Western Division meeting of American Philosophical Association in Los Angeles. (Paper title: 'Testimony and Perception: some Contrasts')

Autumn 1997: Visiting Fellow in Philosophy Dept, University of Edinburgh. Gave several seminars in the dept.

Oct 1997: Paper in visiting speaker series, Phil Dept, St Andrews

Nov 1997: trip to Ireland to give papers at Queens University, Belfast, and Trinity College Dublin, (early draft of paper above given at APA, March 1998)

April 1997: invited paper in dept guest speaker seminar series, New York University (paper title: "Self-Knowledge: Special Access or Artefact of Grammar - a dichotomy rejected.")

October 1996: Main speaker at British Academy sponsored anglo-polish epistemology conference in Warsaw. (paper title: 'Locating Epistemic Justification')

Sept 1996: 2-week residency in Philosophy Dept, University of Colorado at Boulder. (Giving a series of seminar talks, to dept and student audiences: topics included self-knowledge, and knowledge through testimony) Gave paper in Philosophy Dept of University of Pittsburgh on same trip.

August 1995: co-symposiast at sponsored workshop on self-knowledge, St Andrews, Scotland.

4. Other Professional Activities, Honours and Positions

2013 - Editorial Board, new APA Journal

2004 - advisory board, Philosophical Perspectives (editor John Hawthorne)

2002 - consulting editor, Episteme

Jan-March 2002: holder of a Mind Association Research Leave Award (unfortunately my work on a projected book on testimony partly funded by this was interrupted by my husband's sudden death in August 2002 - see Appendix 1)

1997 - Editorial Board, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

October 1994 - 1997: Member of Executive Committee, Aristotelian Society

Jan - March 1995 : Holder of a British Academy Research Leave Award

I regularly referee articles on testimony and in philosophy of mind and language for philosophy journals including: *Dialectica*; *Nous*; *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (of which I'm on editorial board); *The Philosophical Review*; *The Philosophical Quarterly*; *Synthese*; *Philosophical Imprint*; *Phil Studies*; *Australasian J Phil*; *Episteme* (ditto); and others.

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Elizabeth Fricker. February 2019

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APPENDIX ONE: Statement of Historic Personal Circumstances

In 1990 my son was born, and in 1994 my daughter. In August 2002 my husband and lifetime partner Prof Michael Bacharach died suddenly and completely unexpectedly while we were on holiday in Italy. I was left to deal with the many administrative and financial consequences of his death (the first was to arrange for his body to be flown back to the UK); and to raise two bereaved children, and run a household, on my own. This was extremely difficult. For the first 3 years after Michael's death I worked only part-time. At the time of his death my children were 12 and 8 years old respectively. My research career was very severely restricted in the next 10 years, both because I had very little time or mental space for research, and because it was impossible for me to travel outside Oxford even overnight. Since my daughter went to university in autumn 2012 I became able to travel to conferences, and have had much more time to pursue my research, as is evident from my CV.

APPENDIX TWO: Abstracts of Some Recent Papers

2019 **Knowing Full Well from Testimony?** in press for *Episteme* special issue celebrating Ernest Sosa's epistemology.

Testimony poses a challenge to systematic epistemology. I cite two kinds of testimony situation where the recipient's belief is not safe, yet intuitively counts as knowledge. Can Sosa's more sophisticated virtue reliabilism, which theorises animal knowledge as apt belief, yield the intuitively correct verdict on these cases? Sosa shows that a belief can be apt, though it is not safe, and so it may seem a quick positive answer is forthcoming. However, I explore complications in applying his AAA framework, regarding what we take as the circumstances in which the subject's attempt is made: the AAA framework does not mandate a particular choice, yet this affects whether the attempt (in particular, a believing in the endeavour to attain truth) comes out as apt or not. I conclude that Sosa's theory is subject to a familiar charge: it does not give a reductive account of knowledge, since we must deploy independent intuitions about whether knowledge is gained in a case, in order to apply it.

2019 **'Epistemic and Practical Dependence and the Value of Skills; Or: Satnavs, Good or Bad?'** in K. Dormandy (ed.) *Trust in Epistemology* Routledge.

In modern society each one of us incurs extensive dependence on others to obtain the outputs of skills that they possess, and oneself lacks - for epistemic skills, specialist knowledge; for practical skills, material outputs. But we each face choices over time as to which skills to seek to acquire oneself. I consider whether there is non-instrumental prudential normative reason for one to seek to acquire skills. I argue that there is an enjoyment-based case for each person to acquire the skills she would enjoy exercising, since the pleasure of exercising a particular skill is a distinct sui generis one, that cannot be obtained except through its exercise. I further argue that each one of us has some reason to ensure she is not skill-less, since possessing some skills is necessary for self-respect, which is necessary for leading a happy life. Finally, I suggest that there are certain abstract skill types that all have some reason to acquire, since they are necessary facilitating conditions for leading a happy life. Amongst these, I argue, are the skills needed to maintain a cognitive map of one's environment, and the ability to make one's way around in it. These are closely linked to autonomy, being in control of the progress of one's life, and hence to a happy human life.

2017c **'Inference to the Best Explanation and the Receipt of Testimony: Testimonial Reductionism Vindicated'** in *Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation*. K. McCain, T. Poston (eds.) Oxford, Oxford University Press: 262-294.

I revisit the debate concerning 'Reductionism versus 'Anti-reductionism' in the epistemology of testimony through the lens of Explanationism – roughly, the thesis that inference to the best explanation (IBE) is the primary means by which the formation of new empirical beliefs is justified. Reductionists insist that, in order for a recipient of testimony to be justified in accepting what she is told, she must have positive grounds to believe the speaker to be trustworthy. My own account, as defended in other work, argues that one who trusts a speaker's testimony, taking her word for what she tells, thereby incurs commitment to holding that the speaker made her utterance in conscientious conformity with the norm of assertion, and knows what she has told. So, on a reductionist account, to be justified in taking the speaker's word, the recipient must have positive empirical grounds to enable her to know this fact, call it KT: that the speaker knows what she stated.

I develop material showing how, on many occasions of testimony, the T-recipient is able to know the relevant instance of KT through an instance of IBE. This idea is not new, having been suggested by Peter Lipton. However I give a specific novel gloss as to what the content of this IBE is: the recipient must be epistemically placed to construct a folk-psychological explanation of the teller's intentional act of telling; one which posits that the teller knows what she states as part of the fragmentary psychological interpretation of her which is posited as the best explanation of her act. Crucial to this explanation is the fact that tellings are governed by a social norm which controls teller's actions and recipients' responses: tell that P only if you know that P. Tacit appreciation that tellings are so governed features in the epistemic route available to the recipient to this best explanation of the teller's act.

I contrast this IBE form of Reductionism about testimonial warrant with a very different form, which I label Humean Reductionism. HR posits that grounds for accepting as true what a speaker tells are through simple enumerative induction from past instances of correlation of what is told with the truth of what is asserted. I develop material that shows this view is a non-starter. There is no way even to identify the content and force of a speech act, short of using IBE deploying folk psychology. So there is no chance of finding correlations between pre-theoretically available utterance types, and worldly states of affairs.

I conclude that, once IBE-Reductionism is distinguished from Humean Reductionism, we quickly see that the sorts of grounds needed for testimony beliefs to be justified on the IBE-Reductionist account are often available to a T-recipient. Hence the case of testimony provides support for Explanationism.

2017b '**Norms, Constitutive and Social, and Assertion**' *American Philosophical Quarterly* 54(4): 397-418. Special issue on social norms (based on papers from conference on social norms at SLU in March 2015).

Williamson has posited that assertion is a speech act type partly constituted by the fact that it is governed by a certain norm: Assert that P only if you know that P. But – as I argue – the interesting and relevant sense in which a practice of making a certain speech act in a community may be governed by a certain norm, requires that this norm regulates the practice, through participants' tacit appreciation of it: in short, that it be a social norm governing the practice. This makes salient the question: Can a certain norm governing an activity be both a social norm and a constitutive norm? There seems to be a tension here – if a norm is constitutive of an activity, how can someone be engaging in the activity and yet fail to conform to it? – So how can social pressure be needed to ensure conformity? To investigate this, I develop ideas through consideration of some examples of norm-governed activities. We discover that there can be activities – competitive ice-dance, football - such that it is constitutive of engaging in the activity that one regards it as subject to certain norms; but one can nonetheless fail to fulfill these norms while genuinely participating. Applying what has been discovered to the case of assertion, we see that it can be constitutive of assertion qua type that one ought only to assert what one knows; while nonetheless individuals can be genuinely making assertions, even while knowingly flouting the norm. A practice in a community wrt some linguistic act-type is that of making assertions just if attitudes surrounding it show it to be governed by the K-Norm as a social norm; and individuals can be motivated to flout the norm, even though their act is constitutively subject to it.

2016 '**Unreliable Testimony**' in *Alvin Goldman and his Critics*. H.Kornblith, B. McLaughlin (eds.) Oxford, Blackwell.

It is very widely accepted that a necessary condition for knowledge is a modal reliability condition such as Sosa's Safety condition. I consider whether testimony gives grounds to

doubt this condition. Modal reliability in one's testimony-reception module requires that any false testimony one may easily encounter be detected and filtered out – not accepted; that one has an EFFECTIVE T-FILTER. If T-recipients generally fail to have such a filter, a dilemma is reached: either reject Safety as a necessary condition on knowledge, or accept that there is little knowledge from testimony. I first consider an alleged challenge from the empirical literature in social psychology re recipients' ability to detect when a person is lying. I argue this challenge fails, because the results from the experimental situations do not export to the sorts of everyday situations that T-recipients face. However, I then go on to describe several types of situation whose prevalence does indeed show a strong tension between a Safety requirement, and the view that we frequently gain knowledge from testimony. I suggest that folk-epistemology judgements are that one can get knowledge, - get the goods – even when one's doing so is not modally robust. I propose instead a kind of causal theory: we have a folk ontology of ways of getting knowledge, and we think a true belief is knowledge when it is acquired via such an approved link; reliability comes in a step back, because this features in our folk judgements identifying ways of getting knowledge.

2015 'Doing What Comes Naturally: Zagzebski on Rationality and Epistemic Self-Trust' in *Episteme* DOI: 10.1017/epi.2015.37 pp.1-16

I offer an account of what trust is, and what epistemic self-trust consists in. I identify five distinct arguments extracted from Chapter 2 of Zagzebski's *Epistemic Authority* for the rationality and epistemic legitimacy of epistemic self-trust. I take issue with the general account of human rational self-regulation on which one of her arguments rests. Zagzebski maintains that this consists in restoring harmony in the psyche by eliminating conflict and so ending 'dissonance'. I argue that epistemic rationality is distinct from psychic mechanisms aimed at eliminating dissonance, and these two sometimes pull in opposed directions.

2015b 'Know First, Tell Later: the Truth about Craig on Knowledge', in Greco.J. and Henderson. D. (eds.) *Epistemic Evaluations*. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 46-86

Edward Craig in *Knowledge and the State of Nature* propounds a broad method and within it a strategy for arriving at an elucidation of concepts, and proposes an account of our concept of knowledge – KNOWS - developed through his own implementation of that strategy. According to Craig our concept KNOWS has evolved from an earlier more subjective concept first introduced to meet a need to 'flag good sources of information'. In my discussion I argue against Craig. First, I maintain that the account of KNOWS that his implementation of his strategy yields is incorrect. In addition, I argue that his reductive-historical implementation of his broad method in relation to KNOWS is incoherent. It is so because his implementation must posit an Original Situation in which a group of individuals both have a language in which they can exchange information, but lack KNOWS. I argue that getting knowledge from other informants can only be done via the speech act of telling, and that this requires possession of KNOWS by both teller and receiver of information. Craig did nonetheless, I conclude, have both a key insight about KNOWS – that the platitude that if one wants more information about a topic it is a good idea to seek someone who knows about it, gives us a valuable clue about KNOWS; and an important and valid thought about methodology – that one can provide an enlightening account of a concept by describing its role in our lives. In my final section I sketch a non-reductive

current-role account of KNOWS. I claim that two key links that constrain the epistemic standards for satisfying KNOWS are first, that it is the norm governing assertion and second, that it is the standard for practical reasoning leading to action. I argue that these are at bottom two aspects of the same fact.

2015c **‘How to Make Individious Distinctions Amongst Reliable Testifiers’** in *Episteme* 12, special 10th Anniversary issue of invited papers. 173-202

I propose an account of the supply domain for testimonial knowledge: intentional acts in which a speaker offers her word on a matter to her intended audience. Such acts are effected by speech acts of telling exploiting a shared language. From this account I derive an account of the proper doxastic response to such a telling that P, namely accepting the speaker’s offered word that P. I show that one who takes the speaker’s word is committed to holding that she was epistemically so placed as to properly offer her word – namely, that she knows that P. I use my account of the supply domain for and proper response to testimony, to show what is wrong with a thin reliabilist conception of the good supply domain for testimony. The thin conception has it that any reliable testifier is an apt source. I argue that only those who know what they state properly offer their word, and only from them can knowledge be gained through what I identify as the Core Mechanism, taking the speaker’s word for what she states. I develop my argument by way of a persuasive analogy with perception: just as only a reliably matching experience that is a *perception* of what it represents can yield perceptual knowledge in the canonical way, so too only reliably true assertions that are so in virtue of the speaker conscientiously conforming to the norm for assertion can yield knowledge from taking of her word. Other one-off ways (I give examples) in which a non-knowing speaker may nonetheless reliably speak truth are like the ‘deviant causal chains’ identified in the literature on perception.

June 2014 **‘Epistemic Trust in Oneself and Others – an Argument from Analogy?’** in T.O’Connor and L. Callahan (eds) *Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue*. Oxford. Oxford University Press. 174-203

I consider whether there is an argument showing that one’s inevitable epistemic self-trust mandates that one should also have a default trust in the beliefs of others as true. I consider two possible such epistemic routes: from one’s belief in the reliability of one’s own epistemic faculties, to a parallel belief in the reliability of others; and a more direct mandate from the fact of one’s own ground-level trusting of one’s own faculties, to a parallel disposition to trust the outputs of others faculties. I argue that neither strategy yields a compelling route apriori from self-trust to trust of any specific others. The first route fails, because the only principle that is apriori compelling – ‘If my faculties are trustworthy, then so are those of relevantly similar others’ - is vacuous and yields no empirical application to any particular others. The second route fails, because the fact that I have no choice but to trust my own faculties does not mean I am rationally required also to trust the faculties of others, where I have a choice. I conclude that one’s grounds for trusting others’ epistemic faculties and their outputs are broadly empirical, and do not particularly go via an argument from analogy from one’s own case.

2012 **‘Stating and Insinuating’**, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 86. 61-94.

An utterer may convey a message to her intended audience by means of an explicit statement; or by a non-conventionally mediated one-off signal from which the

audience is able to work out the intended message; or by conversational implicature. I investigate whether the last two are equivalent to explicit testifying, as communicative act and epistemic source. I find there are important differences between explicit statement and insinuation: only with the first does the utterer overtly assume full responsibility for the truth of what she communicates to her audience.

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