Britain, even if the torture had not been committed by agents of the British government. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to accept Sager’s invitation to suppose that the United States and the United Kingdom are equal along the dimension of political justice. And, just perhaps, there is a causal connection between that fact and the absence of U.S.-style judicial review in the United Kingdom.

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The past several decades have witnessed an important discussion among political scientists, constitutional lawyers, and philosophers of the proper role of religious reasons in a liberal democracy. There is, claims Paul Weithman in *Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship,* a standard approach to that topic, articulated and defended in some form or other by John Rawls and Robert Audi, among others. According to that standard approach, citizens are “free equals” (6) and ought to be treated as such by government. And in order for government to treat citizens as free equals, government must justify political arrangements to citizens on the basis of accessible reasons, where an accessible reason is, roughly, a kind of reason that informed and rational persons recognize (or would recognize) as an appropriate basis for justifying political arrangements. This constraint on how government ought to treat citizens has direct implications for how citizens ought to treat one another. Citizens ought to participate in politics responsibly, and that means that they ought not to make political decisions on the basis of reasons disallowed for government: “It would be irresponsible for a citizen to vote for or publicly advocate a measure if she does not reasonably think government would be justified in enacting it should her side win the political contest” (133). And since government may not justify political arrangements on the basis of inaccessible grounds, the citizens who collectively influence what government does may not justify political arrangements on the basis of inaccessible grounds.

What does this have to do with the proper role of religious reasons? On all versions of the standard view, religious reasons are inaccessible: appeals to scripture, or to a religious authority, needn’t be regarded by adequately informed and rational citizens as good reasons, much less as appropriate bases for political arrangements (6, 148, 180). Given that, it’s impermissible for government to justify political arrangements to citizens on religious grounds. Correlatively, it’s impermissible for citizens either to vote or to advocate that other citizens vote on the basis of religious reasons.

One of the most attractive features of Weithman’s effort is the evident appreciation he has for the view he nonetheless rejects: he explicitly recognizes the great appeal of the standard approach and goes so far as to say that the various elaborations of the standard approach are “so compelling” that it might “seem inescapable” (6). This is in part because of the attractiveness of its un-
derlying view of citizenship—of citizens as “cosovereigns who govern their society collectively by using their common powers of reason” (7). His evident appreciation for the standard approach is manifested in his careful and sympathetic explication of the most compelling versions of the standard approach—those of Robert Audi (148–79) and John Rawls (180–211). And it’s closely connected with one of his central themes: although he grants that advocates of the standard approach (Rawls, most particularly) have articulated “a very attractive ideal” (213), that some practice is ideal does not imply that it’s obligatory. And so even if citizens in a fully ideal society would hew to the standard approach, that does not imply that citizens in actual societies ought to do so (186, 210–11).

What principles of obligation do apply to citizens in the actual world? Central to Weithman’s competing view are the following two principles:

(5.1) Citizens of a liberal democracy may base their votes on reasons drawn from their comprehensive moral views, including their religious views, without having other reasons which are sufficient for their vote—provided they sincerely believe that their government would be justified in adopting the measures they vote for.

(5.2) Citizens of a liberal democracy may offer arguments in public political debate which depend upon reasons drawn from their comprehensive moral views, including their religious views, without making them good by appeal to other arguments—provided they believe that their government would be justified in adopting the measures they favor and are prepared to indicate what they think would justify the adoption of the measures.

Notice that, unlike the standard approach, Weithman advocates distinct standards for voting and political advocacy (see 126ff. for justification), but in both cases, he permits citizens to rely exclusively on religious grounds. Notice as well that, although Weithman is committed to the claim that citizens may vote and advocate solely on religious grounds, he doesn’t condone citizens who do so irresponsibly. Far from it: responsible voting is not only an excellence but also an obligation of liberal democratic citizenship (103)—where sufficient conditions for responsible voting are spelled out in principle 5.1. And why must citizens vote responsibly? Here, Weithman appeals to a universalizability test. (According to Weithman, “when a person voluntarily participates in a collective undertaking [such as voting in an election or initiative], he has a responsibility to do his part in ways that pass a universalizability test” [104].) If it were generally known that citizens voted for what they knew to be inadequate reasons, then I would know that my serious interests were not given due consideration in the very collective undertaking that manifestly affects those interests (an election or initiative in a liberal democracy). But that’s not something I am willing to accept; nor are others. Hence, citizens generally have an obligation to vote responsibly. Weithman articulates a parallel argument for the claim that citizens must engage in responsible political advocacy: if citizens irresponsibly engaged in public political advocacy, then they would undermine the very civility and trust that is a necessary condition of (fruitful?) political advocacy (110).

So citizens have an obligation of citizenship to engage responsibly in voting and advocacy, where principles 5.1 and 5.2 express sufficient conditions for such responsible political practice. And while restrictive, those two principles are
nevertheless permissive in the crucial respect—they allow for citizens to vote and advocate solely on religious grounds. What argument does Weithman articulate for those permissions? Well, he has many arrows in his quiver, but the following strikes me as central to his project.

The standard approach depends on a conception of citizenship according to which each citizen is a free equal and therefore reasonably expects to be treated as someone to whom reasons of the appropriate sort—accessible reasons—are due. And since each citizen is a person to whom accessible reasons are due, citizens have an obligation of citizenship to vote and advocate on the basis of accessible—and therefore nonreligious—reasons. But, claims Weithman, it’s plausible to claim that citizens have that role-specific obligation only if there is no reasonable disagreement about the underlying conception of citizenship. And there is reasonable disagreement about that conception.

According to Weithman, reasonable disagreement occurs when reasonable people reasonably differ, and that in turn depends on how the relevant persons arrive at their conclusions: Are they willing to cooperate with others on fair terms? Do they take seriously the possibility that their reasoning has been corrupted? What explains their divergent opinions (136–37)? Such questions, Weithman insists, cannot be properly answered without adverting to the relevant empirical data about how citizens have arrived at their convictions. And here we arrive at what I regard as the most distinctive and important contribution of Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship, namely, its constructive and deft reliance on a vast sociological literature on the manner in which religious institutions (churches, synagogues, and mosques) shape citizens.

Weithman marshals an impressive array of evidence that shows in detail that religious institutions provide citizens with civic and political resources of great value to liberal democracy. Churches (and other religious institutions) contribute to the achievement of a crucial political good—what Weithman calls “realized citizenship” (14)—by serving as venues for political discussion, by providing citizens with the opportunity to develop politically useful organizational and parliamentary skills, and by “teaching the sacred character of civic obligations, including voting” (41). This is particularly the case with respect to the disadvantaged: “Religious institutions provide the only counterweight to [the] institutional tendency to reinforce educational and financial advantage, particularly in the way they foster the development of civic skills” (44).

Now the very churches that enable citizens to realize their citizenship, and so to embrace as their own the role obligations of citizenship, also shape the way citizens think about all manner of particular political matters. The very churches that provide citizens with civic skills of use in organizing a political protest also shape the way citizens think about the political matters that they ought to protest: “It is safe to assume that when churches mobilize . . . citizens, churches also give them religious reasons for action and arm them with religious political arguments” (48). And it’s unreasonable to expect such citizens to reject the conception of citizenship which they acquire from their churches—a conception that will often license them to vote and advocate solely on religious grounds. For to reject that conception is to threaten the contribution churches make to the “enormous social achievement” of realized citizenship (140). Since churches further the great good of realized citizenship and also provide citizens
with a conception of citizenship that licenses exclusively religious voting and advocacy, and since prohibiting citizens from acting in accord with that conception of citizenship would inhibit churches from furthering the realization of citizenship, and since inhibiting churches from furthering the great good of realized citizenship would result in some citizens’ disengagement from politics, it’s reasonable for such citizens reasonably to embrace a conception of citizenship that permits them to vote and advocate on exclusively religious grounds. Simply put, for some citizens, particularly the poor and minorities, the standard approach comes at far too high a cost; they reasonably reject that approach, and so it is unreasonable to demand that such citizens comply with the approach. Some more permissive conception of citizenship, principles 5.1 and 5.2 in particular, seems much more appropriate to the lived realities of citizenship in the contemporary United States.

This last argument—only one of the many Weithman articulates for his two principles—raises a concern about his use of the sociological literature on religion and citizenship. It’s not clear to me that Weithman provides a persuasive case against the claim that requiring churches to abide by the standard approach militates against their performing the democratically beneficial services Weithman enumerates. And if churches can inculcate in their members the conception of citizenship favored by advocates of the standard approach without thereby being inhibited from performing their current democratically useful functions, then it would not be the case that expecting citizens to adhere to that conception of citizenship would come at such high cost that citizens may reasonably reject that conception. (Weithman addresses this concern on 140ff., but I’d like to hear more.)

This is, however, only a worry, a question, not an indictment. Far from it: Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship is a terrific book, replete with subtle insight, sympathetic exegesis, moral seriousness, and trenchant argument. It enters into productive discussion with the most forceful advocates of the common claim that citizens should not vote or engage in political advocacy on solely religious grounds. And, in my estimation, it articulates a superior alternative: a conception according to which citizens vote and advocate for those political arrangements that they conscientiously and sincerely believe to further the common good, even if they have only religious reasons for their convictions. No one interested in the current state of the discussion on religion and politics can afford to miss this book.

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In the Beginning Was the Deed is the first to be published of three posthumous volumes of Bernard Williams’s papers. Its general topic is political philosophy, the subject of a book that Williams was working on during the last years of his